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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950296-CA 
vs. : 
WILLIAM RICK DELONG, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE QF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1994) and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (Supp. 1994). This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1994) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's 
verdict? 
A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will only be 
reversed for insufficient evidence when the evidence is "so 
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inconclusive or so inherently improbable that %reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant 
committed the crime." State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994)(quoting State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1994), governing 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, provides: 
(a)It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and 
intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance, unless it was obtained under a 
valid prescription or order, directly from a 
practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this subsection . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (Supp. 1994), governing the 
possession of drug paraphernalia, provides: 
It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess 
with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, 
propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, 
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, 
ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this 
chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted, as charged, 
of one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), a third-degree felony, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced 
defendant to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 79-
81). This timely appeal followed (R. 73). 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989). 
On October 27, 1994, Officer Keith Savage of the Cedar City 
Police Department stopped a vehicle with a broken tail light (R. 
122). Defendant was driving the vehicle, and a juvenile, J.R., 
was in the front passenger seat (R. 130). As Officer Savage 
approached the vehicle, he heard defendant say, "This shit always 
happens to me" (R. 123). When Officer Savage asked defendant for 
his license and registration, defendant told him that it had been 
revoked (R. 122). 
At this point, a second officer, Officer Holm, arrived on 
the scene (R. 123). After verifying with dispatch that 
defendant's license had been revoked/ Officer Savage asked 
defendant if there was anything illegal in the vehicle, and 
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defendant *implied that there wasn't" (R. 123-24). The officer 
then asked for and received consent to search the vehicle (R. 
124) . 
Defendant and J.R. exited the vehicle, and the officers 
patted them both down (R. 124). Although no weapons were found 
on defendant, Officer Holm discovered a "straw" sticking out of 
J.R.'s wallet (R. 124-25, 157).x 
Officer Savage then searched the vehicle, finding various 
items of drug paraphernalia and other items commonly associated 
with drug use (R. 126-45) . Specifically, he saw 10 packages of 
Zig Zag rolling papers in plain view just under the dash on the 
hump of the drive line (R. 126). He discovered another straw and 
a chrome set of scales on the driver's sun visor (R. 126). In a 
gray cloth bag beneath the passenger seat, he found more Zig Zag 
rolling papers, a bullet-type measuring device, two more pens 
converted into straws, a clothes pin, a 60-watt light bulb 
(altered to be used for heating methamphetamine and drawing off 
the smoke), another smaller bulb with one or two straws attached 
to it, and a bottle of Clear Eyes (R. 126-27). Near the 
passenger door of the vehicle, Officer Savage found a wood 
1
 A "straw" is a pen with its internal parts removed and is 
often used to ingest drugs (R. 125). 
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marijuana pipe (R. 127). In the glove compartment, he found a 
blue box containing another set of scales and a pipe with a long 
tan tube attached (R. 127). Officer Kenneth Stapley, responding 
to the scene with a drug-detecting dog, also searched the vehicle 
and located a knife with a burnt end and a roach clip (R. 132-34, 
152-53). Three of the items found in the vehicle tested positive 
for methamphetamine (R. 129-30, 184). 
At trial, defendant's wife testified that defendant often 
drove the vehicle, although it was registered to her (R. 173). 
She did not put any of the contraband items in the vehicle, nor 
did she own any of those items (R. 175-77). 
Sixteen-year-old J.R., who had pled guilty in juvenile court 
to attempted possession of a controlled substance, also testified 
(R. 206, 208). J.R. admitted that he had used methamphetamine on 
the date defendant was arrested, that defendant was his very good 
friend, that he did not want to see defendant go to prison again, 
and that he would do whatever he felt was in his friend's best 
interest (R. 207). J. R. testified that one of the pen straws 
and the roach clip found in the vehicle were definitely his, and 
that the brown marijuana pipe, one set of scales, and one other 
pen straw might be his (R. 204, 205). 
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Finally, defendant testified. He testified that he drove 
the car "just about every day" (R. 216). He denied knowing that 
any of the contraband was in the vehicle. He also specifically 
denied that any of the items were his (R. 212-15). Defendant 
admitted that he had smoked methamphetamine in the past, that 
J.R. was a close friend, and that he did not observe any of the 
paraphernalia on J.R.'s person when he entered the automobile (R. 
217-18). 
Based on this evidence, the jury convicted defendant of 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the claim that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction, he has waived consideration of the issue 
on appeal. 
In any event, the evidence is sufficient to support 
defendant's conviction. A jury is the sole judge of credibility 
and may not only consider the evidence before it, but also the 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. 
Considering the credibility of defendant and his witness, the 
evidence, and its fair inferences, the jury's verdict was not so 
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inherently improbable as to raise reasonable doubt about 
defendant's guilt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT QNE 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS CLAIM THAT THE 
EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT HIS 
CONVICTION, HE HAS WAIVED CONSIDERATION OF 
THE ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
Defendant asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient 
to convict him of possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. In order for this Court to 
consider such a claim, defendant "must marshal the evidence 
supporting the . . . findings and demonstrate how the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the disputed findings." State v. 
Peterson. 841 P.2d 21, 25 (Utah App. 1992). If a defendant fails 
to marshal the evidence, the right to have the claim considered 
on appeal is waived. State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
In this case, defendant selectively cites only those facts 
that could be interpreted to bolster his argument that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Thus, 
defendant offers as conclusive proof of the insufficiency of the 
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evidence the facts that defendant did not own the car, defendant 
was not concealing drugs or paraphernalia on his person, J.R. was 
concealing paraphernalia on his person, J.R. admitted that some 
of the items of paraphernalia may have been his, and J.R. was 
seated near where most of the drugs and paraphernalia were found 
(Br. of App at 8). 
Defendant, however, ignores the evidence not supportive of 
his argument. He fails to consider that multiple items of 
paraphernalia were found in the driver's side of the car's 
interior and that all of the items were within the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle, which was under defendant's direct 
control (R. 261-66). He further ignores J.R.'s testimony that 
he would do whatever he felt was in defendant's best interests, 
and that he did not want to see defendant return to prison (R. 
206-07). Finally, he ignores defendant's admission of past 
methamphetamine use (R. 218) . 
Defendant has thus failed to marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict. £e& Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 799-800 (Utah 1991). In addition, he has 
not considered any of the inferences that could properly be drawn 
from this evidence. To have his claim considered on appeal, 
defendant must demonstrate how all of the evidence as well as the 
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inferences that may properly be drawn from that evidence are so 
"inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained some doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other grounds. State v. Walker. 
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). Because defendant has both failed to 
acknowledge all of the evidence and, further, has not considered 
any of the reasonable inferences arising from that evidence, his 
claim is waived. Moore. 802 P.2d at 738. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S VERDICT THAT DEFENDANT UNLAWFULLY 
POSSESSED BOTH METHAMPHETAMINE AND DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA. 
In any event, defendant's argument that the evidence adduced 
at trial was insufficient to support his conviction fails on the 
merits. Specifically, defendant asserts that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that he was in constructive possession of 
the contraband found in the vehicle (Br. of App. at 5). 
Under the doctrine of constructive possession, a defendant 
may be found to possess contraband within the meaning of section 
58-37-8(2) without actual physical possession. If the State can 
demonstrate that the items were "'subject to the dominion and 
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control of the accused/' then the accused is in constructive 
possession of the items. State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 
(Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Carlson. 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 
1981)). To establish constructive possession, the State must 
demonstrate that the nexus between the accused and the contraband 
was close enough to support the inference that the accused had 
"both the ability and the intent to exercise control and dominion 
over the drug." Id. (citing State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316, 319 
(Utah 1985) . Plainly, determining whether the nexus is 
sufficient to support the necessary inference will be a fact-
sensitive inquiry that must consider all of the circumstances 
surrounding each case. Constructive possession may be 
established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. 
Carlson. 635 P.2d at 74. 
In defendant's view, State v. Salas. 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah 
App. 1991), disposes of this case. In Salas. this Court 
recognized that ownership or occupancy of a vehicle to which 
others have access is insufficient in and of itself to establish 
the necessary nexus for constructive possession. Salas. 820 P.2d 
at 1388 (citing State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). 
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Other evidence must bolster the inference that defendant 
possessed the contraband.2 Id. 
In this case, the evidence was significantly different than 
in Salas and more than sufficient to support an inference of 
constructive possession. Defendant, who admitted to past 
methamphetamine use, was driving the vehicle at the time the 
officer stopped him and discovered the contraband (R. 122, 218). 
Defendant's first words were, "This shit always happens to me" 
(R. 123). While defendant's words give rise to a possible 
inference of guilt, the defendant in Salas spontaneously said, 
"They put it here," giving rise to the opposite inference. 
Salas. 820 P.2d at 1389. 
While defendant did not own the car or have sole access to 
it, the owner testified that defendant drove the car almost 
daily, that she knew nothing about the contraband, that the only 
2
 In Salas, the only other evidence that linked defendant to 
the drugs was hearsay evidence of a confidential informant's tip to 
a police officer. The informant never testified, was never 
identified, and his statements were admitted only to explain why 
the officers were looking for drugs. The statements had not been 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, so they could not be 
used as evidence to bolster the nexus between defendant and the 
drugs. Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389. Because the only other evidence 
of a nexus between defendant and the drug was defendant's occupancy 
of the vehicle, this Court determined that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the inference that defendant possessed the 
drug. Id. at 1389-90. 
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other persons who used the car were not drug-users, and that she 
had not seen any contraband in the car since it had been repaired 
twelve days earlier (R. 173, 175-77, 180). In Salaa, the owner 
of the vehicle did not testify. 
Further, defendant had easy access to the contraband, all of 
which was found in the front passenger compartment of the car, 
within his reach. In Salas. the drugs were found in the 
backseat, near where a passenger had made furtive gestures. 
Salas. 820 P.2d at 1389. In addition, in this case, ten packages 
of Zig Zag papers were in plain view on the drive shaft hump 
between the seats, putting defendant on notice that, if the 
papers weren't his, someone had tampered with his car (R. 126). 
In Salas. the contraband was hidden from view. 
The testimony of defendant's own witness also supports the 
inference that defendant possessed the contraband. In his 
opening statement, defense counsel previewed the testimony of the 
juvenile passenger, J.R.: 
Finally, you're going to hear from another 
witness by the name of Jed Redington. . . . 
Mr. Redington had been at the house, he had 
these items and put them in the vehicle while 
Mr. Delong was inside. Mr. Delong came 
outside and while he was inside he put these 
items under the seat and in the glove box, 
and then he didn't --he didn't tell Mr. 
Delong that they were there. 
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(R. 120). J.R.'s testimony, however, failed to corroborate this 
preview. 
J.R. testified that his participation in this matter had 
already been adjudicated in juvenile court, that defendant was 
his "very good friend," that he did not want to see defendant go 
to prison again, and that he would do whatever he thought was in 
defendant's best interest (R. 207-08). A fair inference from 
J.R.'s "safe" legal status and his professed allegiance to his 
friend is that he might be disposed to lie in order to protect 
his friend. If he testified that the contraband was his and that 
he put it in the car, defendant might well be acquitted. 
Contrary to defense counsel's preview, however, J.R. 
testified only that he owned or maybe owned a few of the items 
and disavowed ownership of several other items (R. 203-05). He 
did not testify that he put anything in the vehicle while 
defendant was in the house. The fact that J.R. had a clear 
motivation to lie by claiming the contraband was his and did not 
do so only adds credibility to his testimony. 
In essence, then, defense counsel set the jury up to believe 
an alternative theory of the case, which he then failed to pursue 
or prove. Thus, even if the jury was inclined to believe 
defendant's denials, it was left without any plausible 
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alternative theory to explain how the contraband came to be in 
defendant's car. 
Defendant denied any knowledge about the numerous items of 
contraband in the vehicle over which he was exercising daily 
control. He also denied that he saw J.R. bring any contraband 
into the vehicle: "I'm not too observant when it comes to my 
passengers. I give them good faith as to know not to bring stuff 
like that into my vehicle because I have enough respect for other 
people if I had any paraphernalia of my own I wouldn't bring it 
into their vehicle" (R. 218-19). 
In assessing the evidence, the jury had to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses. The law is well-settled in this 
regard. "Determinations of witness credibility are left to the 
jury. The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of 
any witness's testimony." State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972 
(Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 901, 904-05 
(Utah App.), cert, denied. 804 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1990). 
Given that the jury apparently chose not to believe 
defendant's wholesale denial of knowledge about the contraband 
found in the car, the remaining evidence provides a sufficient 
nexus between defendant and the contraband to support the 
inference that defendant intended to exercise control and 
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dominion over the contraband. The jury's determination was thus 
not so inherently improbable as to raise reasonable doubt about 
defendant's guilt. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
Based on this Court's prior development of the issues raised 
in this case, the State does not request oral argument. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of February, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
c 
JQANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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